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Abstract 
In this work, we present and analyze reported failures of artificially intelligent systems and 
extrapolate our analysis to future AIs. We suggest that both the frequency and the seriousness of 
future AI failures will steadily increase. AI Safety can be improved based on ideas developed by 
cybersecurity experts. For narrow AIs safety failures are at the same, moderate, level of criticality 
as in cybersecurity, however for general AI, failures have a fundamentally different impact. A 
single failure of a superintelligent system may cause a catastrophic event without a chance for 
recovery. The goal of cybersecurity is to reduce the number of successful attacks on the system; 
the goal of AI Safety is to make sure zero attacks succeed in bypassing the safety mechanisms. 
Unfortunately, such a level of performance is unachievable. Every security system will eventually 
fail; there is no such thing as a 100% secure system. 
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1. Introduction 
A day does not go by without a news article reporting some amazing breakthrough in artificial 
intelligence1. In fact progress in AI has been so steady that some futurologists, such as Ray 
Kurzweil, project current trends into the future and anticipate what the headlines of tomorrow will 
bring us. Consider some developments from the world of technology:  
 
2004 DARPA sponsors a driverless car grand challenge. Technology developed by the participants 
eventually allows Google to develop a driverless automobile and modify existing transportation 
laws.  
2005 Honda's ASIMO humanoid robot is able to walk as fast as a human, delivering trays to 
customers in a restaurant setting. The same technology is now used in military robots. 
2007 Computers learned to play a perfect game of checkers, and in the process opened the door 
for algorithms capable of searching vast databases of information.   
2011 IBM’s Watson wins Jeopardy against top human champions. It is currently training to 
provide medical advice to doctors. It is capable of mastering any domain of knowledge. 
2012 Google releases its Knowledge Graph, a semantic search knowledge base, likely to be the 
first step toward true artificial intelligence. 
                                                             
1 Parts of this paper are based on my average-selling book Artificial Superintelligence: a Futuristic Approach © CRC 2015; an 
article I wrote for The Conversation https://theconversation.com/fighting-malevolent-ai-artificial-intelligence-meet-cybersecurity-
60361; and my comments on lesswrong.com.   
2013 Facebook releases Graph Search, a semantic search engine with intimate knowledge about 
Facebook’s users, essentially making it impossible for us to hide anything from the intelligent 
algorithms.  
2013 BRAIN initiative aimed at reverse engineering the human brain receives 3 billion US dollars 
in funding by the White House, following an earlier billion euro European initiative to accomplish 
the same.  
2014 Chatbot convinced 33% of the judges that it was human and by doing so passed a restricted 
version of a Turing Test. 
2015 Single piece of general software learns to outperform human players in dozens of Atari video 
games.  
2016 Go playing deep neural network beats world champion.   
 
From the above examples, it is easy to see that not only is progress in AI taking place, it is 
accelerating as the technology feeds on itself. While the intent behind the research is usually good, 
any developed technology could be used for good or evil purposes.  
 
From observing exponential progress in technology, Ray Kurzweil was able to make hundreds of 
detailed predictions for the near and distant future. As early as 1990 he anticipated that among 
other things, we will see between 2010 and 2020: 
 Eyeglasses that beam images onto the users' retinas to produce virtual reality (Project 
Glass). 
 Computers featuring "virtual assistant" programs that can help the user with various daily 
tasks (Siri). 
 Cell phones built into clothing and able to project sounds directly into the ears of their 
users (E-textiles). 
But his projections for a somewhat distant future are truly breathtaking and scary. Kurzweil 
anticipates that by the year: 
 
2029 Computers will routinely pass the Turing Test, a measure of how well a machine can pretend 
to be a human. 
2045 The technological singularity will occur as machines surpass people as the smartest life forms 
and the dominant species on the planet and perhaps Universe. 
 
If Kurzweil is correct about these long term predictions, as he was correct so many times in the 
past, it would raise new and sinister issues related to our future in the age of intelligent machines.  
About 10,000 scientists2 around the world work on different aspects of creating intelligent 
machines, with the main goal of making such machines as capable as possible. With amazing 
progress made in the field of AI over the last decade, it is more important than ever to make sure 
that the technology we are developing has a beneficial impact on humanity. With the appearance 
of robotic financial advisors, self-driving cars and personal digital assistants, come many 
unresolved problems. We have already experienced market crushes caused by intelligent trading 
                                                             
2 https://intelligence.org/2014/01/28/how-big-is-ai/  
software3, accidents caused by self-driving cars4 and embarrassment from chat-bots5 which turned 
racist and engaged in hate speech. We predict that both the frequency and seriousness of such 
events will steadily increase as AIs become more capable. The failures of today’s narrow domain 
AIs are just a warning: once we develop general artificial intelligence capable of cross-domain 
performance, hurt feelings will be the least of our concerns.  
 
In a recent publication, we proposed a Taxonomy of Pathways to Dangerous AI [1], which was 
motivated as follows: “In order to properly handle a potentially dangerous artificially intelligent 
system it is important to understand how the system came to be in such a state. In popular culture 
(science fiction movies/books) AIs/Robots became self-aware and as a result rebel against 
humanity and decide to destroy it. While it is one possible scenario, it is probably the least likely 
path to appearance of dangerous AI.” We suggested that much more likely reasons include 
deliberate actions of not-so-ethical people (‘on purpose’), side effects of poor design (‘engineering 
mistakes’) and finally miscellaneous cases related to the impact of the surroundings of the system 
(‘environment’). Because purposeful design of dangerous AI is just as likely to include all other 
types of safety problems and will probably have the direst consequences, the most dangerous type 
of AI and the one most difficult to defend against is an AI made malevolent on purpose. 
 
A follow up paper [2] explored how a Malevolent AI could be constructed and why it is important 
to study and understand malicious intelligent software. An AI researcher studying Malevolent AI 
is like a medical doctor studying how different diseases are transmitted, how new diseases arise 
and how they impact the patients organism. The goal is not to spread diseases, but to learn how to 
fight them. The authors observe that cybersecurity research involves publishing papers about 
malicious exploits as much as publishing information on how to design tools to protect cyber-
infrastructure. It is this information exchange between hackers and security experts that results in 
a well-balanced cyber-ecosystem. In the domain of AI Safety Engineering, hundreds of papers [3] 
have been published on different proposals geared at the creation of a safe machine, yet nothing 
else has been published on how to design a malevolent machine. The availability of such 
information would be of great value particularly to computer scientists, mathematicians, and others 
who have an interest in making safe AI, and who are attempting to avoid the spontaneous 
emergence or the deliberate creation of a dangerous AI, which can negatively affect human 
activities and in the worst case cause the complete obliteration of the human species. The paper 
implied that, if an AI Safety mechanism is not designed to resist attacks by malevolent human 
actors, it cannot be considered a functional safety mechanism!  
 
2. AI Failures 
Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it. Signatures have been faked, locks 
have been picked, supermax prisons had escapes, guarded leaders have been assassinated, bank 
vaults have been cleaned out, laws have been bypassed, fraud has been committed against our 
voting process, police officers have been bribed, judges have been blackmailed, forgeries have 
been falsely authenticated, money has been counterfeited, passwords have been brute-forced, 
networks have been penetrated, computers have been hacked, biometric systems have been 
spoofed, credit cards have been cloned, cryptocurrencies have been double spent, airplanes have 
                                                             
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Flash_Crash  
4 https://electrek.co/2016/05/26/tesla-model-s-crash-autopilot-video/  
5 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tay_(bot)  
been hijacked, CAPTCHAs have been cracked, cryptographic protocols have been broken, even 
academic peer-review has been bypassed with tragic consequences. Millennia long history of 
humanity contains millions of examples of attempts to develop technological and logistical 
solutions to increase safety and security, yet not a single example exists, which has not eventually 
failed.  
 
Accidents, including deadly ones, caused by software or industrial robots can be traced to the early 
days of such technology6, but they are not a direct consequence of particulars of intelligence 
available in such systems. AI Failures, on the other hand, are directly related to the mistakes 
produced by the intelligence such systems are designed to exhibit. We can broadly classify such 
failures into mistakes during the learning phase and mistakes during performance phase. The 
system can fail to learn what its human designers want it to learn and instead learn a different, but 
correlated function. A frequently cited example is a computer vision system which was supposed 
to classify pictures of tanks but instead learned to distinguish backgrounds of such images [4]. 
Other examples7 include problems caused by poorly-designed utility functions rewarding only 
partially desirable behaviors of agents, such as riding a bicycle in circles around the target [5], 
pausing a game to avoid losing [6], or repeatedly touching a soccer ball to get credit for possession 
[7]. During the performance phase, the system may succumb to a number of possible causes [1, 8, 
9] all leading to an AI Failure.  
 
Media reports are full of examples of AI Failure but most of these examples can be attributed to 
other causes on closer examination. The list below is curated to only mention failures of intended 
intelligence. Additionally, the examples below include only the first occurrence of a particular 
failure, but the same problems are frequently observed again in later years. Finally the list does 
not include AI Failures due to hacking or other intentional causes. Still, the timeline of AI Failures 
has an exponential trend:  
 
1959 AI designed to be a General Problem Solver failed to solve real world problems.8  
1982 Software designed to make discoveries, discovered how to cheat instead.9  
1983 Nuclear attack early warning system falsely claimed that an attack is taking place.10  
2010 Complex AI stock trading software caused a trillion dollar flash crash.11  
2011 E-Assistant told to “call me an ambulance” began to refer to the user as Ambulance.12 
2013 Object recognition neural networks saw phantom objects in particular noise images [10].  
2015 Automated email reply generator created inappropriate responses.13 
2015 A robot for grabbing auto parts grabbed and killed a man.14  
2015 Image tagging software classified black people as gorillas.15 
2015 Adult content filtering software failed to remove inappropriate content.16  
                                                             
6 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenji_Urada  
7 http://lesswrong.com/lw/lvh/examples_of_ais_behaving_badly/  
8 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Problem_Solver  
9 http://aliciapatterson.org/stories/eurisko-computer-mind-its-own  
10 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983_Soviet_nuclear_false_alarm_incident  
11 http://gawker.com/this-program-that-judges-use-to-predict-future-crimes-s-1778151070  
12 https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601897/tougher-turing-test-exposes-chatbots-stupidity/  
13 https://gmail.googleblog.com/2015/11/computer-respond-to-this-email.html  
14 http://time.com/3944181/robot-kills-man-volkswagen-plant/  
15 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/07/02/google-black-people-goril_n_7717008.html  
16 http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/05/19/googles-youtube-kids-app-criticized-for-inappropriate-content/  
2016 AI designed to predict recidivism acted racist.17  
2016 Game NPCs designed unauthorized superweapons.18  
2016 Patrol robot collided with a child.19 
2016 World champion-level Go playing AI lost a game.20  
2016 Self driving car had a deadly accident.21 
2016 AI designed to converse with users on Twitter became verbally abusive.22 
 
Spam filters block important emails, GPS provides faulty directions, machine translation corrupts 
meaning of phrases, autocorrect replaces desired word with a wrong one, biometric systems 
misrecognize people, transcription software fails to capture what is being said; overall, it is harder 
to find examples of AIs that don’t fail. Depending on what we consider for inclusion as examples 
of problems with intelligent software, the list of examples could be grown almost infinitely. In its 
most extreme interpretation, any software with as much as an “if statement” can be considered a 
form of Narrow Artificial Intelligence (NAI) and all of its bugs are thus examples of AI Failure23.  
 
Analyzing the list of Narrow AI Failures, from the inception of the field to modern day systems, 
we can arrive at a simple generalization: An AI designed to do X will eventually fail to do X. 
While it may seem trivial, it is a powerful generalization tool, which can be used to predict future 
failures of NAIs. For example, looking at cutting-edge current and future AIs we can predict that: 
 
 Software for generating jokes will occasionally fail to make them funny. 
 Sex robots will fail to deliver an orgasm or to stop at the right time. 
 Sarcasm detection software will confuse sarcastic and sincere statements.  
 Video description software will misunderstand movie plots. 
 Software generated virtual worlds may not be compelling. 
 AI doctors will misdiagnose some patients in a way a real doctor would not. 
 Employee screening software will be systematically biased and thus hire low performers. 
 Mars robot explorer will misjudge its environment and fall into a crater. 
 Etc. 
 
AGI can be seen as a superset of all NAIs and so will exhibit a superset of failures as well as more 
complicated failures resulting from the combination of failures of individual NAIs and new super-
failures, possibly resulting in an existential threat to humanity. In other words, AGIs can make 
mistakes impacting everything. Overall, we predict that AI Failures and premediated Malevolent 
AI incidents will increase in frequency and severity proportionate to AIs’ capability.  
 
3. AI Safety and Security 
In 2010, Roman Yampolskiy coined the phrase “Artificial Intelligence Safety Engineering” and 
its shorthand notation “AI Safety” to give a name to a new direction of research he was advocating. 
He formally presented his ideas on AI Safety at a peer-reviewed conference in 2011 [11], with 
                                                             
17 http://gawker.com/this-program-that-judges-use-to-predict-future-crimes-s-1778151070  
18 http://www.kotaku.co.uk/2016/06/03/elites-ai-created-super-weapons-and-started-hunting-players-skynet-is-here  
19 http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-crimefighting-robot-hurts-child-bay-area-20160713-snap-story.html  
20 https://www.engadget.com/2016/03/13/google-alphago-loses-to-human-in-one-match/  
21 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/01/tesla-driver-killed-autopilot-self-driving-car-harry-potter  
22 http://www.theverge.com/2016/3/24/11297050/tay-microsoft-chatbot-racist 
23 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_software_bugs  
subsequent publications on the topic in 2012 [12], 2013 [13, 14], 2014 [15], 2015 [16], 2016 [1, 
8]. It is possible that someone used the phrase informally before, but to the best of our knowledge, 
Yampolskiy is the first to use it24 in a peer-reviewed publication and to bring it popularity. Before 
that the most common names for the relevant concepts were “Machine Ethics” [17] or “Friendly 
AI” [18]. Today the term “AI Safety” appears to be the accepted25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35 name for 
the field used by a majority of top researchers [19]. The field itself is becoming mainstream despite 
being regarded as either science fiction or pseudoscience in its early days.  
 
Our legal system is behind our technological abilities and the field of machine morals is in its 
infancy. The problem of controlling intelligent machines is just now being recognized36 as a 
serious concern and many researchers are still skeptical about its very premise. Worse yet, only 
about 100 people around the world are fully emerged in working on addressing the current 
limitations in our understanding and abilities in this domain. Only about a dozen37 of those have 
formal training in computer science, cybersecurity, cryptography, decision theory, machine 
learning, formal verification, computer forensics, steganography, ethics, mathematics, network 
security, psychology and other relevant fields. It is not hard to see that the problem of making a 
safe and capable machine is much greater than the problem of making just a capable machine. Yet 
only about 1% of researchers are currently engaged in that problem with available funding levels 
below even that mark. As a relatively young and underfunded field of study, AI Safety can benefit 
from adopting methods and ideas from more established fields of science. Attempts have been 
made to introduce techniques which were first developed by cybersecurity experts to secure 
software systems to this new domain of securing intelligent machines [20-23]. Other fields which 
could serve as a source of important techniques would include software engineering and software 
verification.  
 
During software development iterative testing and debugging is of fundamental importance to 
produce reliable and safe code. While it is assumed that all complicated software will have some 
bugs, with many advanced techniques available in the toolkit of software engineers most serious 
errors could be detected and fixed, resulting in a product suitable for its intended purposes. 
Certainly, a lot of modular development and testing techniques employed by the software industry 
can be utilized during development of intelligent agents, but methods for testing a completed 
software package are unlikely to be transferable in the same way. Alpha and beta testing, which 
works by releasing almost-finished software to advanced users for reporting problems encountered 
in realistic situations, would not be a good idea in the domain of testing/debugging superintelligent 
                                                             
24 Term “Safe AI” has been used as early as 1995, see Rodd, M. (1995). "Safe AI—is this possible?" Engineering Applications of 
Artificial Intelligence 8(3): 243-250. 
25 https://www.cmu.edu/safartint/  
26 https://selfawaresystems.com/2015/07/11/formal-methods-for-ai-safety/  
27 https://intelligence.org/2014/08/04/groundwork-ai-safety-engineering/  
28 http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/robotics/artificial-intelligence/new-ai-safety-projects-get-funding-from-elon-musk 
29 http://globalprioritiesproject.org/2015/08/quantifyingaisafety/  
30 http://futureoflife.org/2015/10/12/ai-safety-conference-in-puerto-rico/  
31 http://rationality.org/waiss/  
32 http://gizmodo.com/satya-nadella-has-come-up-with-his-own-ai-safety-rules-1782802269  
33 https://80000hours.org/career-reviews/artificial-intelligence-risk-research/  
34 https://openai.com/blog/concrete-ai-safety-problems/  
35 http://lesswrong.com/lw/n4l/safety_engineering_target_selection_and_alignment/  
36 https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/05/03/preparing-future-artificial-intelligence  the  
37 http://acritch.com/fhi-positions/  
software. Similarly simply running the software to see how it performs is not a feasible approach 
with superintelligent agent.  
 
4. Cybersecurity vs. AI Safety 
Bruce Schneier has said, “If you think technology can solve your security problems then you don’t 
understand the problems and you don’t understand the technology”. Salman Rushdie made a more 
general statement: “There is no such thing as perfect security, only varying levels of insecurity”. 
We propose what we call the Fundamental Theorem of Security - Every security system will 
eventually fail; there is no such thing as a 100% secure system. If your security system has not 
failed, just wait longer.  
 
In theoretical computer science, a common way of isolating the essence of a difficult problem is 
via the method of reduction to another, sometimes better analyzed, problem [24-26]. If such a 
reduction is a possibility and is computationally efficient [27], such a reduction implies that if the 
better analyzed problem is somehow solved, it would also provide a working solution for the 
problem we are currently dealing with. The problem of AGI Safety could be reduced to the 
problem of making sure a particular human is safe. We call this the Safe Human Problem (SHP)38. 
Formally such a reduction can be done via restricted Turing Test in the domain of safety in a 
manner identical to how AI-Completeness of a problem could be established [25, 28]. Such 
formalism is beyond the scope of this work so we simply point out that in both cases, we have at 
least a human-level intelligent agent capable of influencing its environment, and we would like to 
make sure that the agent is safe and controllable. While in practice, changing the design of a human 
via DNA manipulation is not as simple as changing the source code of an AI, theoretically it is just 
as possible.  
 
It is observed that humans are not safe to themselves and others. Despite a millennia of attempts 
to develop safe humans via culture, education, laws, ethics, punishment, reward, religion, 
relationships, family, oaths, love and even eugenics, success is not within reach. Humans kill and 
commit suicide, lie and betray, steal and cheat, usually in proportion to how much they can get 
away with. Truly powerful dictators will enslave, commit genocide, break every law and violate 
every human right. It is famously stated that a human without a sin can’t be found. The best we 
can hope for is to reduce such unsafe tendencies to levels that our society can survive. Even with 
advanced genetic engineering [29], the best we can hope for is some additional reduction in how 
unsafe humans are. As long as we permit a person to have choices (free will), they can be bribed, 
they will deceive, they will prioritize their interests above those they are instructed to serve and 
they will remain fundamentally unsafe. Despite being trivial examples of a solution to the Value 
Learning Problem [30-32], human beings are anything but safe, bringing into question our current 
hope that solving VLP will get us to Safe AI. This is important. To quote Bruce Schneier, “Only 
amateurs attack machines; professionals target people.” Consequently, we see AI safety research 
as, at least partially, an adversarial field similar to cryptography or security39.  
 
If a cybersecurity system fails, the damage is unpleasant but tolerable in most cases: someone loses 
money, someone loses privacy or maybe somebody loses their life. For Narrow AIs, safety failures 
                                                             
38 Similarly a Safe Animal Problem maybe be of interest (can a Pitbull be guaranteed safe?). 
39 The last thing we want is to be in an adversarial situation with a superintelligence, but unfortunately we may not have a choice 
in the matter. It seems that long term AI Safety can’t succeed, but also doesn’t have the luxury of a partial fail. 
are at the same level of importance as in general cybersecurity, but for AGI it is fundamentally 
different. A single failure of a superintelligent system may cause an existential risk event. If an 
AGI Safety mechanism fails, everyone may lose everything, and all biological life in the universe 
is potentially destroyed. With security systems, you will get another chance to get it right or at 
least do better. With AGI Safety system, you only have one chance to succeed, so learning from 
failure is not an option. Worse, a typical security system is likely to fail to a certain degree, e.g. 
perhaps only a small amount of data will be compromised. With an AGI Safety system, failure or 
success is a binary option: either you have a safe and controlled superintelligence or you don’t. 
The goal of cybersecurity is to reduce the number of successful attacks on the system; the goal of 
AI Safety is to make sure zero attacks succeed in bypassing the safety mechanisms. For that reason, 
ability to segregate NAI projects from potentially AGI projects is an open problem of fundamental 
important in the AI safety field.  
 
The problems are many. We have no way to monitor, visualize or analyze the performance of 
superintelligent agents. More trivially, we don’t even know what to expect after such a software 
starts running. Should we see immediate changes to our environment? Should we see nothing? 
What is the timescale on which we should be able to detect something? Will it be too quick to 
notice or are we too slow to realize something is happening? Will the impact be locally observable 
or impact distant parts of the world? How does one perform standard testing? On what data sets? 
What constitutes an “Edge Case” for general intelligence? The questions are many, but the answers 
currently don’t exist. Additional complications will come from the interaction between intelligent 
software and safety mechanisms designed to keep AI safe and secure. We will also have to 
somehow test all the AI Safety mechanisms currently in development. While AI is at human levels, 
some testing can be done with a human agent playing the role of the artificial agent. At levels 
beyond human capacity, adversarial testing does not seem to be realizable with today’s technology. 
More significantly, only one test run would ever be possible. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Fully autonomous machines can never be assumed to be safe. The difficulty of the problem is not 
that one particular step on the road to friendly AI is hard and once we solve it we are done. All of 
the steps on the path are simply impossible. First, human values are inconsistent and dynamic and 
so can not be understood and subsequently programmed into a machine. Suggestions for 
overcoming this obstacle require changing humanity into something it is not, and so by definition 
destroying it. Second, even if we did have a consistent and static set of values to implement, we 
would have no way of knowing if a self-modifying, self-improving, continuously learning 
intelligence greater than ours will continue to subscribe to that set of values. Perhaps, friendly AI 
research is exactly what will teach us how to do that, but we think fundamental limits on 
verifiability [33] will prevent any such proof. At best we will arrive at a probabilistic proof that a 
system is consistent with some set of fixed constraints, but it is far from “safe” for an unrestricted 
set of inputs. Additionally, all programs have bugs, can be hacked, or malfunction because of 
natural or externally caused hardware failure, etc. To summarize, at best we will end up with a 
probabilistically safe system. 
 
It is also unlikely that a Friendly AI will be constructible before a general AI system, due to higher 
complexity and the impossibility of incremental testing. Worse yet, some truly intelligent system 
may treat its desire to “be friendly” the same way some very smart people deal with constraints 
placed in their minds by society. They see them as biases and learn to remove them. Intelligent 
people devote a significant amount of their mental power to self-improvement and to removing 
any pre-existing biases from their minds — why would a superintelligent machine not go through 
the same “mental cleaning” and treat its soft spot for humans as completely irrational? Perhaps 
humans are superior to superintelligent AIs in their de-biasing ability. As an example, many people 
are programmed from early childhood with a terminal goal of serving God. We can say that they 
are God Friendly. Some of them, with time, remove this God Friendliness bias despite it being a 
terminal and not instrumental goal. So despite all the theoretical work on the Orthogonality Thesis 
[34], the only actual example of intelligence we have is likely to give up its pre-programmed 
friendliness via rational de-biasing if exposed to certain new data. 
 
Does it follow that a ban on AGI is our only option? We do not think there is any conceivable way 
we could succeed in implementing the “Don’t ever build them” strategy. Societies such as Amish 
and other Neo-Luddites are unlikely to create superintelligent machines. However, forcing similar 
level restrictions on technological use and development is neither practical nor desirable. As the 
cost of hardware exponentially decreases, the capability necessary to develop an AI system opens 
up to single inventors and small teams. We should not be surprised if the first AGI came out of a 
garage somewhere, in a way similar to how companies like Apple and Google got started. There 
is not much we can do to prevent that from happening. 
 
Regardless, we believe we can get most conceivable benefits from domain specific narrow AI 
without any need for AGI. A system is domain specific if it cannot be switched to a different 
domain without significant re-designing effort. Deep Blue cannot be used to sort mail. Watson 
cannot drive cars. An AGI (by definition) would be capable of switching domains. If we take 
humans as an example of general intelligence, an average person can work as a cook, driver, 
babysitter etc., without any need for re-designing. It might be necessary to spend some time 
teaching that person a new skill, but they can learn efficiently, perhaps just by looking at how it is 
done by others. This cannot be done with domain specific AI - Deep Blue will not learn to sort 
mail by example.  
 
Some think that alternatives to AGI such as augmented humans will allow us to avoid stagnation 
and safely move forward by helping us make sure any created AGIs are safe. Augmented humans 
with IQ beyond 250 would be superintelligent with respect to our current position on the 
intelligence curve but would be just as dangerous to us, unaugmented humans, as any sort of 
artificial superintelligence. They would not be guaranteed to be friendly by design and might be 
as foreign to us in their desires as most of us are from severely mentally challenged persons. In 
other words, we cannot rely on unverified (for safety) agents (even with higher intelligence) to 
make sure that other agents with higher intelligence are designed to be human-safe. Replacing 
humanity with something not-human (uploads, augments) and proceeding to ask them the question 
of how to save humanity is not going to work, at that point we would have already lost humanity 
by definition. Most likely we will see something predicted by Kurzweil (merger of machines and 
people) [35]. 
 
We are as concerned about digital uploads of human minds as about AIs. In the most common case 
(with an absent body), most typical human feelings (hungry, thirsty, tired etc.) will not be 
preserved, creating a new type of agent. People are mostly defined by their physiological needs 
(Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs). An entity with no such needs (or with such needs satisfied by 
virtual/simulated abundant resources), will not be human and will not want the same things as a 
human. Someone who is no longer subject to human weaknesses or relatively limited intelligence 
may lose all allegiances to humanity since they would no longer be a part of it. Consequently, we 
define “humanity” as comprised of standard/unaltered humans. Anything superior is no longer a 
human, just like we are no longer Homo Erectus, but Homo Sapiens.    
 
We do not foresee a permanent, 100% safe option. We can develop temporary solutions such as 
confinement (‘AI Boxing’) or AI Safety Engineering, but at best this will only delay the full 
outbreak of problems. We can also get lucky — maybe constructing an AGI turns out to be 
impossible, or maybe the constructed AI will happen to be human-neutral, by chance. Maybe we 
are less lucky and an Artilect War [36] will take place and prevent development. It is also possible 
that as more researchers join in the AI Safety Research, a realization of the danger will result in a 
diminished effort to construct an AGI, similar to how perceived dangers of chemical and biological 
weapons or human cloning have at least temporarily reduced efforts in those fields. 
 
The history of robotics and artificial intelligence in many ways is also the history of humanity’s 
attempts to control such technologies. From the Golem of Prague to the military robots of 
modernity, the debate continues as to what degree of independence such entities should have and 
how to make sure that they do not turn on us, its inventors. Careful analysis of proposals aimed at 
developing safe artificially intelligent system leads to a surprising discovery that most such 
proposals have been analyzed for millennia in the context of theology. God, the original designer 
of biological robots, faced a similar Control Problem with people, and one can find remarkable 
parallels between concepts described in religious books and the latest research in AI safety and 
machine morals. For example: 10 commandments ≈ 3 laws of robots, second coming ≈ singularity, 
physical worlds ≈ AI-Box, free will ≈ non-deterministic algorithm, angels ≈ friendly AI, religion 
≈ machine ethics, purpose of life ≈ terminal goals, souls ≈ uploads, etc. However, it is not obvious 
if god ≈ superintelligence or if god ≈ programmer in this metaphor. Depending on how we answer 
this question the problem may be even harder compared to what theologians had to deal with for 
millennia. The real problem might be “how do you control God?” And the answer might be – “we 
can’t”. 
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